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ANTONIO CARLOSLEMGRUBER
Fu ndaçjo Gvtuli o Varga
An Analysis ofFriedman'sHypotheses
on Monetary Correction
Many eminenteconomists have been in favorof indexationor monetary correction1 One can mention,for example, EdgeworthJevons, Marshall Irving Fisher, andKeynes. More recently,Machlup, Musgrave,Patjnkjn Tobjo, Samueisonand Friedman,among others, have akoadvocated indexation.2 Ina very recent publicationui, Milton Friedmanhas dis- cussed in somedetail_but onlyverbally_ukarguments in favor of indexation for dealingwith the presentsituation inmany Countries He emphasized two points:
It would reduce therevenue that governmentacquires from inflationvhicl also means thatgovernment would have lessincentive to inflate-. !ancll .it would reduce theinitial adverse sideeffects on outputand employme,toi effective measuresto end inflation1, p.261
In this paper, Ianalyze Friedman'shypotheses onnlonetary correctiorli I present a more detailed studyof his secondhypothesis and I limitmyself to a few comments ina short section regardingthe firsthypothesiseffectson government revenue frominflation.
In Section I,Idiscuss Friedman'sargument that monetarycorrectjon_ the widespreaduse of escalator
clauses__reduces theundesjrabl side effects stemming fromending inflation,using his owntheoretical model for
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the short-run division of a change in nominal income between prices and
real output 2. Following this longer discussion, Section II contains simula-
tion exercises of the macroeconomic effects of indexation, as a comple-
ment to the analysis in SectionI.In the shorter SectionIII,Iconsider
Friedman's hypothesis about the effects of indexation on government
revenue from inflation. Some conclusions are presented in Section IV.
[II MONETARY CORRECTION AND THE SIDE EFFECTS
According to Friedman,
Higher inflation reflects an acceleration in the growth rate of total money
spending. Ending inflation requires a deceleration in the growth rate of total
spending. The reason for the side effects from such change in total spending [the
boom or the recessionl is the time delay between an increased or decreased rate
of growth of total money spending and the full adjustment of output and prices to
that changed rate...11, p. 311
.. Aslowdown in total spending will .. .tend to be reflected initially in a
widespread slowdown in output and employment. . ..Itwill take sonic time
before these responses lead in turn to widespread reductions in the rateof
inflation. ...it will take still more time before expectations about intialion are
revised. [encouragingl a resumption of employment and output. 11, p. 311
These side effects fundamentally reflect distortions introduced intorelative
prices by unanticipated inflation or deflation, distortions thatarise because
contracts are entered into in terms of nominal prices undermistaken perceptions
about the likely course of inflation.... The way toreduce these side effects is to
make contracts in real, not nominal, terms. This can be done by thewidespread
use of escalator clauses.1, pp. 33-341
Indexation will shorten the time it takes for a recluctiorì inthe rate of growth
of total spending to have its full effect in reducing the rateof inflation. As the
deceleration of demand pinches at various points in the economy, anyeffects on
prices will be transmitted promptly to wage contracts, contractsfor future delivery,
and interest rates... .Accordingly.....osts will go up less rapidly than they
would without indexation....1, p.43[
In what follows, an attempt will hemade to formaltze Friedman's
argument on the effects of indexatiori onthe short-run trade-off between
inflation and real output or inflation andunempIoyment using his own
'theoretical framework" [21.It will become clear that Friedmancertainly
had the dynamic short.run model hedeveloped in121in mind when he
formulated his ideas on monetary correction.
The model can he summarized as follows:4$
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1) !og v,1) kg Y, - 1) log f
1) log P, = (C) log er)' +(L) log Y,(1) log Y
!+ yX,
(C) log P4)= fiD log P + (I/3) (0 log 1 (
(C) log V,)' = (1) log P) * + L) logy'
DX,1) log Yt(1) log
One also hypothesizes with Friedmanthat (0 log y)* is a constant,and call
itg hereafter, It must be noticedthat DX = K1-- X, where X, = logy - (log ye)'. Theexpectational model in(3)is an adaptive one.s
With D log Y,---the rate of changeof nominal income--exogcnotsthe above model is complete. Theendogenous variables are: 1) logy,, 11) log P1, (0 log P1)4, (0 log1)*,and X1. Given the rate of changeof nominal
income the past history ofeach variable, and the trendrate of growth of
output g, the model explains theactual growth of realoutput, the rate of
inflation, the formation ofanticipations for inflation and nominalincome, and the real outputgap.
itis hypothesized that1 >> 0,'y > 0, andI> /3.> 0.
Evidently, the model wouldbe much more interestingfor policyUN poses if one replaced the hypothesis
C) log Y, = exogenous variable
with any of the followingthree different formulationsof Friedman'smone- tary theory of nominal income:
(6a)C) log Y, = a 0 log M,a > 0
(6h(0 log Y, =C)log M, + hC)(0 log Y,('(b > 0
(6c)D log Y, = (0 log Y,)+ c(D log M' - C) log M,")+ (i(lOg M,'
-log M,") c, ci > 0
In that case, 0 logM (or D log M1-therate of change of themoney supply (or themonetary base)would be theexogenous policy variable, As the model isrecursive, one can, however,neglect (6a)-(6c) and undertake the analysisas if 1) log',' were theexogenoi.js variable that makes the systemmove. This simplificationseems to be quite adequate for the purposes ofmy analycis and, most important,it avoids themonetarist bias of equations(6a)-(6c).
The basic equation ofthe short-run modeliscertainly (2)anac- celerationist variant ot thePhillips curve.ItcoLild also he writtenas













celerationist coefficient ot unity,7 to change in excess demand, and to the
level of excess demand measured by the output gap X.
For the purpose of this analysis, I shall make one further simplification by
assuming that a = 0, neglecting. consequently, the change in the excess
demand variable in the accelerationist equation (2a). The analysis that
follows will be more manageable with such simplification, which does not
affect the basic short-run Phillips curve-type trade-off between inflation
and output or between inflation and unemployment, i.e., between D log P1
arid X1.
One can eliminate all the anticipated variables and reduce the system to
a two-equation model:
0 ogP, = D log P..1
+ X -yX
X1 = 0 logY -0 logP - g + X,_1
Notice that 0 log y1the actual growth of real outputcan always be
obtained from equation (1), and that g or (0 log yis a constant.
The reduced forms of the model are:
0 logP = AD logP,_1 4- BX,1 + (I - A)D logY -(1 - A)8
= -AD log P,1 +I - B) X -'\D log Y - Ag
where
-vJ3 l>A= " >0
l-13+y 1-13+.y
and
1 > A + 6> 0
c, d>0
Moreover, a third interesting reduced forni, for 0 log y, could be immedi.
e money ately obtained from 0 log Y - 0 log P, with coefficients - A, - B, A, and
variable. (1 - A), respectively, for the four independent variables that appear in (9)
(6c) and or (10).
ble that After some substitutions, Friedman's model can be reduced to the
luate for following second-order difference equations:
onetarist
(11)1) logP,= (A + 1Bj DlogP1 - Al) IogP2
±1 - A) L) logY + A + B -- 1)0 log Yr1
an ac-
,en as (12) = (A + 1 - B)XI - AX_2 + AD log Y - AD logY1_1
an ac-
For 0 log y, the equation would then be:
(13)0 logy1 = (A + 1B)D logy,1- AD log y2 + AD logY1
- 2AD log Y+ AD log Y12 + Hg60 Antonio Carlos Lemgr'jber
Notice how the real variables X and D log y are affected by the
acceleration of the rate of change of nominal income, as suggested by
Fiied,nan. More formally, one can now obtain impact multiphers, some
interim multipliers, and the total multiplier8 related to the effects of a
change in the exogenous variable D log Y,and, of course, D log M1--on
the endogenous variables D log P,, X, and D log y:
Period D log Pr Sign X1 Sign L) log y Sign
0 1-A 4- A + A +
1 A-A(A-B) + A(A-B) A(A--8)-A-
04-11-A(A-B) +A+A(A-B) + A(A-B)




Itisimportant to notice that when 1 > AB > 0, or A > B, the
ambiguous signs disappear.
Itis also easy to see' that the solutions of the system of difference
equations (9) and (10), which is equivalent to the second-order difference
equations (11) and (12), will depend upon the roots of the characteristic
equation
A2 - (A + I - B)A + A = 0
These roots are, of course,
)A+] B):(A+1_B)24A + _l___
2 2
where
2> (A 4-1 - B)(I)(2±y)>0
It goes without saying that these realor complex roots depend upon /3 and
y, andIwill come back to them later.
Having presented all these results derived froma discrete version of
Friedman's dynamic model, onecan now use them to discuss the question
of indexation. Friedman's verbalreasoning willbe interpreted as an
argument that monetary correction leads or correspondsto a high value of
/3, i.e., /3 would be very close to 1.0 so that inflationaryanticipations would


























Such results indicate that in factthe larger the value of/3, the greaterthe
impact multiplier for 0 log P1 andthe smaller the impactmultipliers for X1
and 0 log Vt. As a matter of fact, inthe extreme case where /3 =1.0, we
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one couldthink of the other extreme situation, where /3 is so close to zero
that price expectations arepractically unaffected by the current inflation
rate--and institutional obstacles aie the causes of the very slowadjustmcnt
process.
As can be seen in the table above,the value of /3 affects the impact and
interim multipliers, that is, theshort-run transitional period before the full
effect of total spending on prices and real Output.Naturally, as one would
expect, /3 does not affectlong-run or total multipliers: these are zero for
real variables and unity for nominalvariables; and long-run quantity theory
of money implications could bederived using also (6a)(6c).
I suggest that Friedman's hypothesisis that the monetary correction, with
the consequent high valuefor /3, will lead to a much more rapid adjust-
ment process and "shortenthe time it takes for a lchange) in the rate of
growth of total spending to have its full effect in... the rateof inflation"
Li, p.43l.
In other words, Friedman is notsuggesting that monetary correction
leads to a vertical Phillips curve in theshort run or a vertical aggregate
supply, a result one would obtainwith /3 = 1 .0. He seems to be saying
only that, due to the quickexpectational adjustment under indexalion, the
vertical Phillips curve in the short run is aresult much closer to reality than
without monetary correction. Moregcneially, his point is simply that the
greater the value of /3, the closerthe /3 to 1.0, and the greater the effect of
economic policy (or nominal income) onprices and the smaller on real
output. Therefore, an anti-inflationarypolicy in an indexed economy will
reduce side effects on outputand employment.
One can investigate his argumentby looking at the effects of different /3's
on some multipliers aswell as on the roots of the characteristicequation
discussed above. Consider, for example,the signs of the partial derivatives
of the multipliers from the abovetable with respect to /3. Notice that aA/3f3
< 0, 8Bl3f3 > 0, and 3(A -B)/8/3 < 0:
Period 1) log P 0 log y62 Antomo Carlos Lerngrub1
have then A = 0, and impact multipliersare equal to total long-run
multipliers. The larger the value of/3, the smaller the value ot /1 and the
smaller the effect of a change in theexogenous variable on the real
variables.
However, when one begins to consider thefirst intenim multiplierand
the sum of the first two periods, forexample, itis not necessarily true that
the larger the /3, the greater and thecloser to 1 .0 the sum for 0 logF,. and
the smaller and the closer tozero the sum for X, and D logYt. And this was
also implicitly suggested by Friedman.It would be incorrect tosuppose that he had only the impactor first-period multipliers in mind.
In order to obtain Friedman'sresultgreater effects on pricesand
smaller effects on real output withhigh values of/3.additionalrestrictions must he imposed relatingf3 andy,or, more specifically, A > B, orB< 11(1
+ y). Observe that when A < B,one obtains the perverse result dueto an
overshooting effect: thesum of the multipliers for inflation isgreater than unity for the first two peri'jds,and consequently the multiplierfor real output will necessarily be negative.
So much for the first twoperiods. More generally, theambiguous signs of the effects of f3on the interim multiplierscan certainly be related to the
characteristic equation A2- (A + 1 - B)A 1- A = 0. In fact, whenever(A +
1- B) - 4A < 0, or /3 >y/(y + 4), the roots of theequation will be complex, resulting in oscillatorymovements of the endogenous variables
while they approach andbefore they reach theirnew long-run equilibrium
values. The oscillation will beclamped and not explosivebecause A < 1.
Thus, unless /3 hasa small value, the complex rootresult is obtained. It can be shown that the derivative of(A - B)2 -- 4A with respect to /3 is
negative.If /3 < y/(y ± 4), thenthe new equilibriumvalues will be gradually andasymptotically approached, since thecharacteristic roots will be real. On the otherhand, because of thesmallness of /3, the adjustment process will be slowwitha value forA closer to 1.0. Observethat for 0 < y < 2, the condition /3 <yI(y + 4) is more restrictivethan the former condition /3 K 1/(1 + y),valid for the first twoperiods. All in al!, these resultssuggest that in fact indexation,or a high value of /3, tends to lead to amore rapid adjustmentprocess, reducing short-run adverse trade-offs. Onthe one hand,a real expansionary boomill become more difficultwithmacroeconomic policies, buton the other hand, the recessionaryeffects of a deflationarypolicy will be reduced. However, for a given valueof y, the greater the/3is, the greater alsothe probability of oscillations,with some overshootingin the transitional period. By contrast,a smaller value of /3 tendsto produce a much slower but nonoscillatorypath from (1- A) to 1 for inflation and fromA to zero for output.








































short-run dynamic model as far as the effect of indexation on the speed of
adjustment is concerned.Itis entirely correct in respect to the impact
multipliers of macroeconomic policies. On the other hand, as far as interim
multipliers are concerned,it must be pointed out that his hypothesis
depends on specific relations between /3 and the Phillips curve coefficient
y. Moreover,adjustment paths tend to be oscillatory under indexatton, in
contrast to cases where expectations adapt slowly. Again, the value of v is
also an important feature of the process.
Therefore, it does appear that monetary correction "would reduce the
side effects on output and employment" 11, p. 261, but it might
possibly lead to some perverse and even undesirable effects because of the
overshooting phenomenon and the dampened oscillation due to the more
rapid transmission of inflation and inflationary anticipations.
In the next section. these theoretical results will be illustrated with
simulation exercises for different values of /3.
liii SIMULATIONS
To complement the analysis of Section I, a few simulation exercises are
presented for two alternative macroeconomic policies with three different
values for the expectational coefficient /3.
In these simulations, there are two alternative policies--"gradualism" or
"shock treatment." They correspond, respectively, to a gradual or a violent
reduction in the growth rate of nominal output (third column in Tables 1
arid 2). Evidently, a simplified hypothesis is used, such as the growth rateof
nominal output equaling the growth rate of the nioney supply. Therefore,
the rate of growth of nominal output is the exogenous variable.
Under the gradualist policy, the rate declines slowly, by 5 percent every
period, reaching a 7 percent growth rate only at the fifth period. With the
shock treatment, thereis an immediate reduction in nominal output
growth, from 37 percentthe initial hypothesisto 7 percent. Otherinitial
hypotheses for the simulations (period or year - 1) are thefollowing:
inflation, 30 percent; deceleration of inflation, 0 percent;nominal output
growth, 37 percent; real output growth, 7 percent; output gap, U percent.10
The simulations were made with the reduced forms (9)and (10). Poten-
tial output growth, (D log y,)' or g, is hypothesized to be 7 percent.The y
coefficient of the Phillips curve is hypothesized to be equal to 0.5.Three
different values are considered for the /3 coefficient: 0.1, 0.5,and 0.9. The
last value is supposed to reflect the behavior of an economywith a high
degree of indexation, while the first value intends toreflect the other
extreme case of a very slow process ofexpectational adjustment.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































68 Antonio Carlos Lemgruhr
as the average results for the first three periods (froni periodzero to periorl
two). Long-run results are also indicated in these tables.
Let us consider first the results for periodzero. Clearly, as a confirmation
of the analysis in the previous section,a low value such as /3 = 0. 1 makes
the nominal output deceleration reflectmuch more on real output thanon
prices. In fact, in the shock treatnientcase, the 30 percent deceleratjon_
from 37 percent to 7 percentisinitially divided between a price decelera
lion of only 10.7 percent anda real growth deceleration of 19.3percent,
leading to a serious recession. rhesame holds true, of course, under the
policy of gradualism althoughon a minor scale (nominal output decelera
lion of 5 percent).
At the other extreme, the high/3 = 0.9 substantially reduces the real
effects of the anti-inflationary policies.For example, with the shocktreat-
ment, the same 30 percent decelerationin period zero is divided intoa 25
percent deceleration of prices anda 5 percent drop in the real output
growth rate. Moreover, in thegradualist case, the contrastappears to be
even more striking, since thereis practically no real effect when /30.9
compared to the case /3= 0.1.
If one selects theaverage values obtained for the first threeperiods (Aver. 0-2 in the tables), similarresults are found. Under shocktreatment, the 30 percent nominal output decelerationleads to a negativeaverage real output growth with /30.1, while in the case /30.9 there is simplyno real effect on theaverage. With gradualism, thecase /3'-0.1 leads to a division of the 10percent average deceleration_from37 percent to 27 percentof nominal incomeas follows: minus 5 percent for theaverage inflation and minus 5percent for the average real growth;and, again, the case /3 = 0.9 has practicallyno real average effects.
More generally, the simulationexercises indicate that, in fact, thehigher the value of /3 is, thegreater the price effectsare and the smaller the real
output effects of an anti-inflationary
macropolicy. There are substantially different results when/3 = 0.1is contrasted with /3= 0.9, while /3 = 0.5
represents an intermediate example_forboth gradualism andshock treat- ment.
As far as the overshootingphenomenon and the resultingoscillations are concerned, they are perhapsof secondary importancein these specific simulations because thefirst-period impact effectsgenerally tend to be of greater magnitude than theinterim effectsand thismay be more evident in the case of shocktreatment Nevertheless theyshould not be neglected, and there aresome perverse effects in thesimulations which helpto indicate that they do havesome relevance.
The shocktreatment example providesevidence of the oscillations generated by high valuesof/3. For instance,with/3 = 0.9, theapparently neutral 7 percent realgrowth figure for theaverage period 0-2 is actuallyanod combination of low growth in period zero (2 percent) and high 9-10
percent growth rates in periodsIand 2.In other words, there is an
tion overshooting phenomenon inperiods 1and 2:the cumulative price
akes deceleration (32 percent) is greater than the nominal 'policy" deceleration
on (30 percent). leading tonegative rates of inflation and real output growth n rates 2 percent above thetrend potential rate of 7 percent.Itis the
era- overshooting that makes the output gap between periods 0 and 2 move in
Cflt, the "wrong" but favorable direction in the case 0.9, in contrast to the
the extreme case f3 = 0.1, where a great recession is the side effect of the
era- restrictive economic policy.
More generally, such overshooting phenomena are responsibc for situa-
real tions of decelerating inflation combined with high real growth ratesas n
eat- the shock treatment case, with 13 = 0.9 and /3 = 0.5, for some intermediate
25 periodsandy of course, for the perverse situations of stagflation, accelerat-
(put ing inflation combined with low or negative real growth rates.
be All in all, the simulations--as well as the analysis of Section Iseem to
0.9 suggest that the more "shock treatment" characterizes astabilization
policy, in contrast to a gradualist approach, the more an indexed economy
ver. is necessary in order to reduce the side effects of the policy. If onerecalls
30 that policymakers tend to manifest their fear of the so-called feedback
real effects of indexation, these simulations indicate precisely the opposite: as




the 11111 1NDEXATION AND REVENUE FROMINFLATION
:her Monetary correction of taxes and government securitiesi.e.,inflation-
cal proofing the income tax and issuing purchasing-powerbondswould
illy certainly reduce government revenue from inflation ("taxationwithout
is representation" 11, p. 291), and, consequently, the authoritieswould have
'at- less incentive to engage in inflation. Friedman Ill discussesin some detail
many indexation-type measures thatwould prevent the government from
are extracting more revenue (income tax) from highernominal incomes11 as
fic well as avoid a greater real national debt by paymentof negative real
of interest rates. These measures include (1) escaatorclauses in the personal
'nt income tax for personal exemption, dedLictions,and tax bracket limits; (2)
ci, escalation of the base for calculating capital gainsand depreciation of fixed
to capital assets for both the personal and the corporate incometax; and (3)
issuance of purchasing-power bonds. Most of these measureshave already
us been adopted in many countries.
tly There is,however, as Friedman points outIll,athird source of
a government revenue which is perhaps the mosthidden form of taxation




through inflation: additionalmoney. Economists are used to studyingthe inflation tax as if itsrate' were the rate of change of themoney ctock (or the monetary base)andits"base" were thelevelof thatmonetary
aggregate.12 One could express thistax in real terms as DM/P,or (DM/A4) x (MIP), where M isa monetary aggregate and P is the generalpr:ce level.
Friedman mentions the followingpossibility:
.Widespread escalation wouldrestrict the government revenue froniinflation simply to the direct taxon cash balances produced by the issueof additional high.powered money...
.It would thereby reduce therevenue froma given rate of inflation, which couldinduce government to raisethe rate of tax.1, p. 44
Thus, monetarycorrection might providean incentive for a higher inflation
tax rate and in thissense be indirectly inflationary,even if it had no direct inflationary effect,as was implicitly suggested inSections I and II above. The purpose of thisshort section is to analyzethe basiccnnsequences of carrying the idea ofindexatjon even further, withmonetary correction of the money supply(or of a great part of it)designed to reduce the direct inflation tax on cash balances.The specific exampleof Brazil'ill be considered in studying thepossibility of a wider indexationof the money stock,13 with only minorconsideration given tooperational problems. But it must bepointed out that hightransaction costs couldmake mi- plementation difficult. Infact, transactioncosts are precisely thereason why even an indexedand neutral inflationpresents a worse situation than price stability.
Monetary correctionwas introduced in Brazil in1965-1966 and has been practicedon a very large scale since.14But the inflationtax has not been neutralized.Holders of money_inthe Ml definition_aretaxed with no monetary correctionand zero nominalinterest rate. However,if one considers a broaderdefinition ofmoney_for example, M3,including time deposits and savingsdeposits withmonetary correction_thenone might speak of a partialindexation of themoney stock. Nominalinterest rates have beenzero (no indexation) forcurrency and demand deposits,in contrast to monetarycorrection plus a real interestrate for time andsavings deposjts.is






































To form an ideaof the relative magnitude ol the inflation taxesthey
represented 10 percent of Brazil's 1973 GDP in the MI case and 14
percent in the M3 case.In the latter case, due to the presence of sonie
indexed components only partof the inflation tax Is effectively collected
and not returned bythe government and the banksand this partis
precisely the Ml tax.
What would happen ifMl were also indexed? Clearly, it would be costly
and difficult to index paper currencyand coins, hut certainly not impossi-
ble; one couldconsider dating currencies, as in S. Gessell's stamp money
proposal discussedin Keynes's Cene:a! Theory. But the principle of
monetary correctionwould seem to apply naturally to demand deposits,
with an indexationcorresponding to interest payment at the inflation rate.
This should reduce thewelfare loss of the inflation tax by restricting it to
currency alone (15percent of Ml in Brazil in 1973-1974). It would create
roughly a real interest ratedifferential between other indexed deposits and
demand deposits, as well as a "monetarycorrection differential" between
demand deposits and currency.Except for currency, this new situation
would actually merely duplicate interestdifferentials that would occur
under price stability, in contrast tothe previous situation where demand
deposits had no indexation.
There is a widespread belief thatthis larger escalation of the money
stock would be inflationary and that itcould lead to runaway inflation. If
one recalls thatinflation is by definition the difference between the rate of
change of the nominal moneysupply and the rate of change of the real
money demanded, one cananalyze this question by looking at the effects
of the Ml indexation on the moneysupply and on the real demand for
money.
As far as the real demandfor money is concerned, the higher interest
rate on money would increasein a once-anti-for-all fashion thereal
demand for money, and in consequencethe flight from other assets into
money would have a deflationaryimpact. Velocity would not increasewith
accelerating inflation as it would withoutthis type of indexation. In other
words, if one simplifies the opportunity costof holding money as the real
interest rate plus the rate of inflationminus the interest rate on money,I
might say that money indexation makesthe real demand for money
become dependent only on the real interest rateand entirely independent
of the actual or the anticipated rate ofinflation.
Therefore, by taking into considerationreal output growth, M!P de-
manded would tend to increase at a more orless constant rate after the
initialonce-and-for-all deflationaryeffect.Itisinterestingto note
although this point will not be pursued furtherherethat the base ot the
inflation tax in real terms, MIP, becomesindependent of the tax rate under
money indexation, but that the taxproceeds are returned to thepublic,
except for currency.
Fried man'c Hypotheses 7172
Atriio(,irIu, Lerugru)
Turning now to the nominalmoney supply, I clearly havetoassume that a greater indexation ot the money stockwon Id not redn((the control of the monetaryauthorities Over therwmetary bje. n 'the;Words it has to be assumed thatthe payment otntcrest on money willnot he financed by issuing additionalbase money. Consequentlylooking at th money supply processdS A'!mB, where' Al is theflloney supply (M IOr M3), rn is thecorresponding monetarymu lti p her, and B s themonet,i r base, one has toassume that the indexa tion ofdenia rid depositsdoes not affect 8, which willContinue to be anexogenous policy variable. But the broaderindexation of themoney stock, with theintro(jtgctjo11 of monetary correctmori for demanddeposits, willcertainl, change themulti plier to the extent thatratios such ascurrency to demand depositsand tiffl deposits to demanddeposits will besubstantiall' modifiedOne would expect, for example,a decline in theseratios due toa larger interest differential in the firstcase and a smaller dif1ereritiml
fl 11)1' latter case. SLI(Ii declines would leadto increases in themonetary multiplier (forMI or M3) and therefore,given the nlonetary base,to an inIlation,)rincrease in the money supply. Howeverthis effect wouldalso be ol theoflceari(ffor all type, and thereis always the alternativeof acompensating one-tiilie movement in themonetary base.
All in all,one could say thatwidesprea(escalationplus a largely indexed morleystoc:k would, infact, be ableto neutralize inflatio,i eliminating itsharmful effectsexcept for the welfarecost of the laxon holders ofcurrency and coinswmthr,thaving anyper nnanient inflationary or deflationary effectof its own. Quitethe contrary thereal deniancg for money should bemore stable in thiscase.16 The fact is thatwithout money indexationi? both thegovernrne( arid the bankscontintie to collectan inflation tax,'8even in an indexedeconomy suchas Brazil, causinga welfare loss to theholders ofmoney. Hence, inflationis not entirelyneutral ever) in countriessuch as Brazil,where only thecosts of unanticig)ate(I inflation can liesaid to beneutralized bymonetary correctionOn the other hand,as suggested byFriedm,iii theCot1clusjnseems correct thatin Brazil thegovernne'5 incentiveto resort toinflation'as dirflinjsl1ed after the introductionof monetarycorrection
[IVJ CONCLUSIONS
This paper hasanalyzed Friedman'shypothese5on nlonetiry('orree tion. He emphasizedthat indexationwould bothease the painsor side effectsot reducing inflationand lower thegovernm,1revenue Ironi inflationAs far
as the side effectsare concernedan analysis withhis own dyrlami(niodel72
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Turning now to the nominalmoney supply, I clearly haveto dSSLJrithat a greater inclexation of themoney stock would not reducethepresent control of the mnnPtaryauthoritje over theIllunietary base. In otherwords it has to be assumedthat thepayment of interest onmoney will not be financed by issuingadditional basemoney. Conseqiieiitly lookingat the money supply processas M = mB, where M is themoney supply (Mlor M3L in is the correspondingmonetary multiplier, arid 13is thenlonctary base, one hasto assume that the indextjonof demand depositsdoes not affect B, which willcontinue to be anexogenous policy variable. But the broaderindexation of themoney stock, with theintroductjn of monetary correction fordemand deposits, willcertainly change themulti. plier to the extent thatratios such ascurrency to demand depositsand time deposits to demand depositswill be substantiallymodified. One would expect, for example,a decline in these ratiosdue to a largerinterest differential in the firstcase and a smaller differentialin the lattercase. Such declines would leadto increases in themonetary multiplier (for Mlor M3) and therefore, giventhe nionetary base,to an inflationaryincrease in the money supply. However, thiseffect would also beof theonce-andforall type, and there is alwaysthe alternative ofa compensatingone-time movement in the monetarybase.
All inall, one couldsay that widespreadescalation plusa largely indexed money stockwould, in fact, heable to neutralizeinflatjon., eliminating its harmfuleffects except forthe welfarecost of the taxon holders of currencyand coinswithouthaving anypernlanent inflationary or deflationary effect ofits own. Quite thecontrary, the real demandfor money should bemore stable in this case.'The fact is thatwithout money indexatjonl7 both thegovernment and the bankscontinue to collectan inflation tax,18even in an indexedeconomy such as Brazil,causing a welfare loss to theholders of money.Hence, inflation isnot entirely neutral even in countries suchasrazil, where onlythe costs ofunanticipated inflation can be saidto be neutralized bymonetary correction Onthe other hand,as suggested by Friedmanthe conclusionseems correct that in Brazil thegovernmen'5 incentive toresort to inflationwas dinii,iishecl after the introductiono monetary correction
llVl CONCLUSIONS
This paper hasanalyzed Friedman'shypotheses onmonetary Correction, He emphasized thatindexatiop would bothease the pains or sideeffects of reducing inflationand lower thegovernment revenue frominflation, As far as the side effectsare concerned,an analysis with hisown dynaniic modelFriedman's Hypotheses 73
indicates that indexation does indeed reduce them, even though it tend';to
provoke more oscillations and some overshooting effects in themain
macrovariables. As to government revenue, Friedman's hypothesisis cer-
tainly correct'9;I simply try to carry the idea of indexationevtin further by
analyzing the case of monetary correction of demand deposits designedto
reduce the direct inflation tax on cash balances.
NOTES
These terms refer to tilewidespread use of price escalator clauses in private and
governmental contracts"1, p251.
For a historical background on indexation and escalator clauses in general, see the
collection of essays in 41. especially the paper by H. Giersch, and the appendixes in M.
Friedman's essay ill. An extensive bibliography on the subject ian also be found in41
and [1!.
It must be emphasized here that Friedman regards escalator clauses simply as ''a lesser
evil than a badly managed money" Ii, p.26( and believes that it vuutd be ''far better to
have no inflation and no escalator clauses. But that alternative is not currently available
[1, p.35>.'' He makes the point that monetary correction substantially inc reases transac-
tion costs, but he thinks that this is the most promising expedient for "both reducing the
harm done by inflation and facilitating the ending of inflation'1. p.45.
See especially equations 39, 44, 45, and 46 in 121. Notice that P represents the general
price level, V is nonirnal national Output (or income), and v is real national output (or
income), so that V = Py. The notation used here follows closely Friedman's own
symbols, but the gap between actual and potential real output, logy - (log y), is catted
X. An asterisk denotes the anticipated value of the variable and, for consistenc'/, Y' =
P'y. A discrete formulation of the model is used, with P log F, = log P, - log P,1
instead of d log PIdt, etc. t.ogarithmic rates of change are used instead oi percentage
rates of changebut see Section It. Therefore, the inflation rate, for example, is 1) tog P,
and not IP,/P,_l - 1, but these are approximately equal, since log d = d1 for small
values of d - 1. No difference is made between potential real output and anticipated
real output, y', and the logarithmic rate of change of potential or anticipated real output
is a constantthe secular or trend rate of growth. Another expression often used by
Friedman is "permanent" income or "permanent" price instead of anticipated income
or anticipated price fur Yand P', respectively.
This model has been used by Friedman since his permanent income hypothesis for the
consumption function, to21. the adaptive expectations model appears in ectuatioris 39
and 57. Notice that il 1.0, then (0 log P,)= 0 log P,an extreme case where
actual inflation is always equal to anticipated inflation, If 13 = 0, then (0 log P,)' is a
constant unaffected by the prevailing inflation rate. More generally,113 > 0. The
rationality of adaptive expectations and the rational expectations niodelan elegant
alternative expectational formulation--are discussed in16!.
See especially equations 38, 48, 51, and 52 in 12!. Notice that M' or M refer to money
supplied, and Md refers to money demanded. Friedman used the IS-tM approach, the
Fisherian theory of interest rates, and some additional hypotheses in order to formulate
his theory of nominal income.
7See also Lemgruber [6). Believers in a long-run Phillips curve would certainly suggest a
coefficient less than unity..--but greater than zerofor the variable ID log Pl'in
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See also Theil71.
See also Goldberg 151.
tO,In these simulations, we have used percentage variationsIt must be noted that, iithe
case of percentage variations, the identities It) and )5) iii thepaper become approsima.
lions. They are really identities in the case of logarithmicvariations, But see footnote4
above. In order to relate the srnulations with thenotation used in Section i, rioti(e that
inflation = D log P1; deceleration of inflation= 0 log P, - 0 log P1_1; nominal output
growth = 0 log Y1; real output growth= D log y; and output gap = Xlogr - dog yj.
'Inflation Increases the yield of the personal andcorporate income tax by pushing
individuals and corporations into higherincome groups" II, p.30).
See, for example, Friedman 131for an analysis of therevenue-maximizing rate of inflation, the revenue-maximizingrate of monetary growth, and the welfarecosts of
collecting the inflation tax. See also footnote16 below,
It is surprising that Friedman_asopporter of payment of interest on money--doc.snot discuss monetary correction of demanddeposits in his essay Ill.
See, for example, 181 and 141.
One should mention that in Brazil there isa prefixed or ex-ante monetary correction icr
time deposits and a postfixedor ex-post indexation br savings deposits. See alsc,18) and 41. In this paper,I do not discuss these differences, butit should be stated thathave been writing about ex-postmonetary correction in the precedingpages The prefixed indexatioris merely a semantic solution to avoidusury laws
In fact, it could be argued thatto the extent that the indexatior) oimoney avoids a drop in MIP as a consequence ofmore inflation and permits MIP to growat a constant rate
given by the growth of real output, monetarycorrection could increase the revenue from
a given rate of inflation by increasing the baseof the inflation tax. This resultmay appear
inconsistent with what Friedman said inIll (see the quotations at the beginning ofthis section) but would be perfectlyconsistent with his demonstration, inan article published in 1971 [31, that the maximumrevenue from inflation can easily be foundat s'ery low rates of inflation or even deflationwhen one introduces growth into thestory For example, after the adjustmentrequired by the once-and-forall effectsin the multiplier the growth of the monetary basein real terms should he equalto the growth of both the real money supply and realoutputand the governmentrevenue from inflation pro- duced might be maximizedat the point of zero inflation (or fullmoney indexation) But in order to establish whether therewould be a net increase ofrevenue from a "larger"
money indexation one woLid haveto analyze more carefully theprecise division of the tax revenue between the pubcand the private sector; this isnot attempted here due to the limited scope of thissluiy,I am indebted to MiguelBroda for very helpful suggestions with respect to thiaspect of the analysis
Clearly, as a counterpart ofthis new indexation themonetary authorities would haveto index bank reserves,
18However, one couldargue that the banking system avoidsthe formal restrictionson interest payments and is forcedby competition with otherfinancial institutions to provide free bankingservices and greater facilities_suchas more agenciesto their customers as a form ofan implicit interest rate.
19.But see footnote 16 wherea different result is suggested, perhapssimply because of alternative semanticinterpretations of Friedman'stexts,
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